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VESSEL .OWNER'S LIABILITY TO THE STATES 
FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE 
By Eugene T. Kinder, Jr. * 
INTRODUCTION 
As a result of an increasing number of oil spills from tankers, 
causing extensive damage to state and private property/ a number 
of states have recently enacted environmental protection legisla-
tion dealing specifically with the problem. Over 60% of the world's 
oil is transported by sea and an effective way to minimize oil spill 
damage and to reimburse those suffering losses is a necessity.2 Be-
cause of the substantial state interest in protecting the local en-
vironment, and because the states have the primary responsibility 
for pollution control under the Environmental Quality Improve-
ment Act,:l it would seem that the state's initiative is proper and 
lawful. However, because these spills occur in the medium of 
navigable waters, which are under federal jurisdiction, the states 
may find that their ability to provide legislative remedies for oil 
pollution damage is severely limited by the existing maritime law. 
This is the conclusion reached by two recent decisions: 
In re Harbor Towing Corporation4 and American Waterway Op-
erators Inc. v. Askew5 (hereinafter Harbor Towing and Askew). 
MARITIME LAW AND ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION 
Under Article 3, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the 
federal judiciary has exclusive jurisdiction over cases in admiralty. 
In addition to this grant of exclusive jurisdiction, Congress has the 
power to regulate activities on navigable waters under the com· 
merce clause. 6 Thus it is generally accepted that the substantive 
maritime law consists of legislation enacted by Congress, and in-
terpreted and applied by federal courts. 7 Admiralty jurisdiction 
applies to all causes of action which arise on "all waters, salt or 
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fresh, with or without tides, which are in fact navigable in inter-
state or foreign commerce."8 Thus admiralty jurisdiction applies to 
all navigable waters, whether they are considered state territory or 
not. 
In 1948, Congress extended admiralty jurisdiction to cover 
damages to shore structures by vessels, by enacting the Extension 
of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Act.1) This Act enabled 
landowners, who suffered damage consummated on land caused by 
a vessel on navigable waters, to take advantage of the jurisdiction 
of the admiralty courts to seek recovery. Since damage to property 
resulting from oil discharged on navigable waters has been recog-
nized as a maritime tort,1O recovery in admiralty is available to 
landowners who can prove negligence of the crew or unseaworthi-
ness of the vessel. Unfortunately, a landowner's ability to recover 
may be somewhat illusory. Shoreline damage resulting from an oil 
spill is often remote in time and distance from the original spill. 
This creates evidentiary problems which make proof of negligence 
in oil spill cases difficult or impossible, even under the liberal 
rules of evidence used in admiralty proceedings in federal courtS.ll 
Additionally, even where the injured landowner successfully proves 
negligence, he may recover less than the amount of his loss. 
In the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Actl2 (hereinafter 
the Limited Liability Act) Congress established a procedure 
whereby an owner of a vessel can limit his liability for damages 
caused by that vessel to his interest in the value of the vessel and 
its freight pending. In the case of an oil spill the difference between 
the actual damage resulting from the spill and the value of the 
vessel and the oil can be considerable. 
The Limited Liability Act is the result of a Congressional effort 
in 1851 to encourage ship building and commerce. Congress en-
acted the Limited Liability Act to limit the potentially great lia-
bility of a vessel owner.l:: The Act provides in part: 
The liability of the owner of any vessel, ... for any loss, damage, or 
injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, 
or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, withollt the privity or 
knowledge of Sllch owner or owners, shall not ... exceed the amount 
or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight 
then pending.H (emphasis added) 
The theory behind this legislation was that while a ship is at sea, 
the owner has minimal control over it and should not be held 
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liable for damages beyond his interest in the vessel and its freight, 
unless such damage was caused by a condition of which, in the ex-
ercise of due diligence, he should have known. This exception to 
the application of the Limited Liability Act is most important to 
the injured party. The federal courts, in an attempt to balance 
the great advantage an owner has in being able to limit liability, 
have placed the burden of proof of establishing lack of knowledge 
on the ownerY Though an owner can generally sustain this bur-
den, he must show more than lack of knowledge. The test is not 
merely what the owner knows, but rather what the owner should 
reasonably have discovered in the exercise of due diligence.16 In 
other words, if the owner himself were negligent, as opposed to 
the negligence of one of his employees, he would not be entitled to 
limit his liability. Furthermore, in certain instances, the owner's 
breach of a non-delegable statutory duty required by the Rules of 
Navigation17 may give rise to a conclusive presumption of privity 
or knowledge in the cause of loss, thus making the owner ineli-
gible to limit his liability under the statute. 1S Thus, where the loss 
is caused by the negligence of the master or crew, limitation will 
be allowed; where the owner's negligence or breach of statutory 
duty is the proximate cause of the loss, limitation will not be al-
lowed. 
While admiralty jurisdiction is available to landowners suffer-
ing oil spill damage, the ability of an owner to limit liability means 
this remedy is feasible only in the small number of instances where 
either knowledge on the part of the owner can be shown, or where 
the total damage caused by the spill does not exceed the value of 
the vessel and its freight. In view of these inadequacies, several 
states have enacted legislation aimed at providing for full recovery 
for oil spill damage. 19 Generally, these laws attempt to eliminate 
the two major obstacles to recovery presented by maritime law, by 
making the owner of a vessel which spills oil strictly liable without 
regard to fault, and by making the measure of recovery actual 
damages rather than the limited interest of the owner. 
For example, California law provides in part that: 
... any owner or operator of any vessel engaged in the ... trans-
portation of petroleum or fuel oil shall be absolutely liable without 
regard to fault for any property damage incurred by the state or by 
any county, city or district, or by any person, ... and for any damage 
... to the natural resources of the state, including. .. marine and 
wildlife resources .... 2(1 
OIL SPILL LIABILITY 565 
Similarly, the State of Washington provides in part that: 
Any person owning oil or having control over the same which enters 
the waters of the state ... shall be strictly liable, without regard to 
fault, for the damages to persons or property, public or private, 
caused by such entry.21 
Connecticut law contains the following provisions: 
Any person ... which directly or indirectly causes pollution and 
contamination of any land or waters of the state through the dis-
charge ... of oil or any petroleum or chemical liquid or product 
shall be liable for all costs and expenses incurred ... in containing 
and removing such pollution .... 22 
Since the transportation of petroleum is an ultra-hazardous 
business likely to cause damage to the public, some writers argue 
that the theory of strict liability is applicable.2~ However, a real 
question exists as to whether states have the legislative authority 
to introduce unlimited, strict liability into the maritime law. As 
stated previously, the maritime law consists solely of federal legis-
lation and federal judicial interpretation, and any state legislation 
in direct conflict with expressed federal objectives would be invalid 
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.24 
Furthermore, even in the absence of a direct conflict, state legisla-
tion may be pre-empted and therefore invalid because of the per-
vasiveness of the federal legislation in the maritime field and the 
overriding national interest in maintaining uniformity in the mari-
time law. This pre-emption question, or rather the extent to which 
state legislation on oil spill recovery is limited by the existing 
federal law, is dealt with in both Harbor Towing and Askew. 
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY: THE BREACH OF STATUTORY 
DUTY ROLE 
Harbor Towing was decided in 1971 by the u.S. District Court 
for the District of Maryland.25 While loading heavy fuel oil at 
a Humble Oil Terminal in Baltimore Harbor, a barge owned by 
the Harbor Towing Corp. negligently spilled 68,000 gallons of oil 
into the harbor. As a result of the spill, the Maryland Port 
Authority and the State Department of Natural Resources claimed 
$28,000 in damage for clean up costs. Humble Oil claimed $170,000 
in additional clean up expenses. With additional private claims, 
the total claimed damages reached approximately $267,000.26 Har-
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bor Towing then filed a petition to limit liability pursuant to the 
Limited Liability Act,27 and the court limited liability to $33,000 
plus the value of the tugboat involved. The Limited Liability Act 
requires apportionment of the limitation fund to each of the claim-
ants by their percentage of the total damage. The state, having a 
claim which represents approximately 10% of the total damage, 
would recover far less than the $28,000 it expended in the clean up 
operations.28 
Since Harbor Towing had not breached a statutory duty under 
the Rules of Navigation which would disallow limitation, the state, 
in order to gain full recovery, argued that breach of a statutory 
duty under Maryland law should make the defendant unable to 
limit liability. To be successful, the state's argument must convince 
the court that Harbor Towing's breach of the Maryland Water 
Resources Act29 by discharging oil is legally equivalent to a breach 
of a non-delegable maritime obligation, which would disallow 
limitation. The Maryland Water Resources Act provides: 
... it shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or permit the dis-
charge of oil in any manner into or upon the waters within the 
jurisdiction of the State of Maryland from any vessel ... 30 
The State asserts that this statute is criminal in nature, and is 
therefore analogous to the federal Wreck Statute which provides in 
part that: 
It shall not be lawful ... to voluntarily or carelessly sink, or permit 
or cause to be sunk, vessels ... in navigable channels ... in such 
manner as to obstruct . . . navigation. And whenever a vessel . . . 
is wrecked and sunk in a navigable channel, accidently or otherwise, 
it shall be the duty of the owner of such sunken craft to immediately 
mark it ... and to maintain such marks until the sunken craft is 
removed or abandoned, and the neglect or failure of the said 
owner so to do shall be unlawful ... 31 
It has been held that violation of the Wreck Statute will make limi-
tation of liability for a subsequent loss unavailable to the owner.32 
There are two rationales for the Wreck Statute exclusion to limi-
tation of liability. The first rationale is that once a wreck occurs, 
the statute imposes an immediate and continuing non-delegable 
duty upon the owner to take steps to insure that the wreck of his 
ship will not cause damage to other vessels.33 Breach of this duty 
makes the owner unable to limit his liability for proximately 
resulting damage. This interpretation seems reasonable under the 
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language of the Limited Liability Act, since the owner has knowl-
edge of a condition which proximately causes damage and thus 
limitation should not be allowed under the privity or knowledge 
exception. The second rationale is based on the statutory duty 
exception and maintains that the breach of the Wreck Statute 
negates the right of limitation because the statute is criminal in 
nature. In The Snug Harbor, the U.S District Court for the East-
ern District of New York stated that "neglect alone predicated on 
the conduct of the owner does not preclude limitation of liability, 
but the violation of a statute criminal in nature does preclude limi-
tation of liability."34 However, this language was dicta, since the 
fact situation of the case supports the first rationale above. The 
court indicated that the major reason for not allowing limitation of 
liability was that the owner had knowledge that the wreck of his 
ship presented danger to navigation, but failed to comply with his 
duties under the Wreck Statute to protect other ships from subse-
quent damage. Thus the damage occurred with the knowledge of 
the owner, and under the Limited Liability Act limitation was not 
available. 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in In 
re Midland Enterprises, Inc.:J5 pointed out that the statutory duty 
exception to limitation may not be a unique exception because the 
authorities, which supposedly support this exception, arise out 
of fact situations in which the owner would be unable to limit his 
liability anyway under the privity or knowledge exception to the 
Limited Liability Act. 36 Knowing breach of a criminal statute or 
of the Rules of Navigation seems to be equivalent to knowledge 
by the owner of the cause of loss and precludes limitation under the 
Limited Liability Act. In other words, under the Midland ratio-
nale, the major consideration in determining whether an owner has 
the right to limit, is not the breach of a duty in itself, but rather 
whether the breach necessarily indicates the knowledge of the 
owner of the cause of loss. When an owner knowingly fails to 
perform a duty required by statute, and that failure is the cause 
of a subsequent loss, the owner may not limit his liability because 
the loss was not "incurred without the privity or knowledge of such 
owner,"37 the prerequisite for limitation. 
Though In re Midland Enterprises, Inc. indicates there are un-
answered questions in this area, its reasoning implies that disallow-
ance of limited liability requires more than a mere showing of a 
violation of a statute, unless that violation implicitly demonstrates 
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the owner's knowledge in the cause of loss. However, this does not 
necessarily void Maryland's argument that a breach of a state 
criminal statute should disallow limitation. In order to uphold the 
state's argument, within the scope of In re Midland Enterprises, 
Inc., the court would have to hold that the Maryland statute pro-
hibiting oil discharges imposed the same non-delegable duty on 
vessel owners that are imposed by the Rules of Navigation. Though 
violation of a statute imposing a non-delegable duty, as for example 
the Wreck Statute, may demonstrate per se such knowledge on the 
part of the owner, the court in Harhor Towing properly points 
out that the Maryland statute does not impose the necessary affir-
mative duty to act once a loss occurs. aM Under the Wreck Statute an 
affirmative duty to mark the wreck arises as soon as the wreck 
occurs. However, the only duty required by the Maryland Statute 
is the duty not to spill oil, and no subsequent duty, analogous to the 
duty to mark under the Wreck Statute, comes into existence when 
the spill occurs. Therefore the discharge of oil resulting from 
negligence of the crew of the barge is particularly the type of loss 
for which limitation of the owner's liability is meant to be avail-
able. 
Though the state is forced into the unsuccessful position of 
analogizing its statute to the Wreck Statute, its argument has some 
force in a different context. An oil spill presents the same problem 
that a wreck does. Once the original act occurs (the discharge of oil 
or the sinking of a vessel) there can be extensive subsequent dam-
age if the spill or the wreck is left unattended. Furthermore, sub-
sequent damage can be minimized or eliminated if proper steps are 
taken immediately to contain the oil or mark the wreck. 
Thus, once an owner gains knowledge that oil has spilled 
from his ship, if he fails to take effective action to prevent subse-
quent loss, he should be considered in privity with the cause of that 
loss and thus not able to limit liability. For example, if an owner 
learns of an oil spill before the oil has reached shoreline property, 
he could perhaps limit his liability as to immediate damage to 
aquatic life, but if he neglects to take action to contain the oil, he 
should not be able to limit liability for the subsequent damage to 
shoreline property. This assumes that state legislation imposes a 
duty on an owner to contain or remove oil once he has learned of a 
spill. Such a statute would make the decision in Harhor Towing 
more difficult, but would not necessarily require a different result, 
since the authority of the states to impose duties on vessel owners 
not imposed by the federal law is dubious. 
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FEDERAL DOMINANCE IN THE MARITIME FIELD: 
THE PRE-EMPTION ISSUE 
Under federal law, there is no duty to remove or contain oil 
which would interfere with the right to limit liability. States have 
no authority to impose such a duty in maritime law if federal legis-
lation is so pervasive and so dominant as to pre-empt state legisla-
tion. For example, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, where a steve-
dore was accidentally killed while unloading a ship, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the New York Workmen's Com-
pensation Act was unconstitutionally applied since Congress alone 
has the power to provide regulations in the maritime law.3D Though 
the states have been allowed to legislate on matters of predomi-
nantly local concern such as piiotage40 and harbor regulations,41 it 
is clear that such legislation may not interfere with the uniform 
federalla w. 42 
The doctrine of pre-emption has also arisen where the state is act-
ing under its police power to protect local environmental interests. 
In Lockheed Air Terminal v. The City of Burbank, the U.S. Court 
of Apl?eals for the Ninth Circuit held that the state police power is 
generally not assumed to be superseded, but federal authority may 
arise by implication where: (1) federal regulation is pervasive; (2) 
the federal interest is dominant; and (3) federal objectives would be 
obstructed by the non-federal regulation.43 Here, the court decided 
that the federal interest in air traffic control pre-empted local legis-
lation affecting air traffic in spite of the prerogative of local govern-
ments to promote local environmental interests under the Environ-
mental Quality Improvement Act.44 Similarly, the constitutionally 
expressed federal interest in maintaining uniformity within the 
maritime law has led federal courts to the conclusion that it is 
federal law which determines a vessel owner's liability and that 
the states are not free to act in this area. 
For example, in The Central States45 the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York dealt with New York's right 
to impose the duty of removal of a sunken vessel on an owner, or 
in the alternative, to hold him fully liable for the removal costs 
incurred by the state. Here, a vessel came in contact with ice in the 
Erie Canal and sank, without negligence on the part of the owner 
or the crew. Under a state criminal statute, the owner was required 
to remove the wreck or be responsible for full removal expenses if 
the state was forced to perform his duty for him.46 However, under 
federal law, a non-negligent owner has the right to abandon a 
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wreck and limit his liability to the value of the vessel and its freight 
pending.47 Thus the court allowed limitation holding that the state 
statute was invalid as conflicting with express federal objectives 
of the maritime law. 
It would seem that a state statute requiring one responsible for 
an oil spill to remove the oil or be subject to full liability for its 
removal might also be invalid as going beyond federal policy on 
oil pollution. However, federal law is silent on the removal of oil 
once spilled, whereas the owner of a wreck has the express right to 
abandon. Because the damage to state waters and property in-
creases if the oil is allowed to remain and disperse in the water, 
the states arguably should have the right to require a vessel owner 
to remove or contain an oil spill; this should particularly be so 
where Congress has not acted either way on the subject. 
In Harbor Towing, the court decided only that the Maryland 
Statute would not disallow limitation since it could not be brought 
within the objectives of the federal policy of disallowing limitation 
in instances of breach of statutory duty.48 In other words, the Mary-
land statute does not impose the affirmative, non-delegable duty re-
quired by maritime law to disallow limitation. The court did not 
deal with the question of whether the state law could effectively 
disallow limitation if the state statute did create a duty analogus 
to that imposed by the Wreck Statute. However, the suggestion was 
made that the Supremacy Clause would be a major obstacle.49 
FEDERAL POLICY OBJECTIVES UNDER THE WATER QUALITY 
IMPROVEMENT ACT-1970 AND THE EFFECT ON 
STATE LEGISLATION 
Though Harbor Towing leaves some unanswered questions as 
to the effect, if any, of state legislation on the operation of federal 
statutes within the maritime law, American Waterway Operators, 
Inc. v. Askew,50 decided one month later in the U.S. District Court 
for the Middle District of Florida, demonstrates that the states may 
be even more limited in their power to legislate appropriate reme-
dies for oil spill victims than Harbor Towing indicated. 
In Askew, the plaintiffs, a group of shippers, insurers, and oil 
companies, challenged the validity of the Florida Oil Pollution 
Control Act on the grounds that it was an attempt by the state to 
legislate within the federal domain of the substantive maritime 
law. The Florida statute, which imposes unlimited liability with-
out regard to fault, provides: 
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... any licensee and its agents or servants, including vessels destined 
for or leaving a licensee's terminal facility, who permits or suffers 
a prohibited discharge ... to take place within state boundaries 
shall be liable to the state for all costs of cleanup or other damage 
incurred by the state and for damages resulting from injury to 
others. In any suit ... it shall not be necessary for the state to plead 
or prove negligence in any form or manner on the part of the 
licensee or any vessel. 51 
The plaintiffs claimed that this statute was pre-empted by the 
Water Quality Improvement Act (hereinafter the W.Q.I.A.) which 
states in part: 
Except where an owner or operator can prove that a discharge was 
caused solely by (A) an act of God, (B) and act of war, (C) negligence 
on the part of the United States Government, or (D) an act or omis-
sion of a third party without regard to whether any such act or 
omission was or was not negligent ... such owner or operator of any 
vessel from which oil is discharged in violation . . . of this section 
shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law, be liable to 
the United States Government for the actual costs incurred under ... 
this section ... in an amount not to exceed $100 per gross ton of 
such vessel or $14,000,000, whichever is lesser, except that where the 
United States can show ... the privity and knowledge of the owner, 
such owner ... shall be liable to the United States Government for 
the full amount of such costS.fi~ 
The W.Q.I.A. sets up a National Contingency Plan for the re-
moval of oil from navigable waters following an oil spill. 53 It pro-
vides for federal intervention in clean up operations when the 
government concludes that the responsible party will not remove 
the oil. 
The Florida statute is clearly much broader in scope than the 
W.Q.I.A. The Florida Statute provides for strict liability with-
out exception. The W.Q.I.A. imposes limited liability for clean up 
costs, but the Florida statute provides for unlimited liability for 
clean up costs and for private property damage. The State argued, 
however, that to the extent that its legislation goes beyond the 
W.Q.I.A. it is merely supplemental where the federal law is silent, 
and that it is not inconsistent with federal objectives. 
Essentially, the state's argument asserts that, liability for an oil 
spill situation, previously determined by the Limited Liability 
Act under the general maritime law, has been modified by the 
W.Q.I.A. Congress, by enacting the W.Q.I.A., has impliedly 
decided that the Limited Liability Act should not apply to oil 
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spill situations and has formulated new law for oil spill liability. 
The state argued that since this legislation refers only to claims by 
the federal government for clean up costs and is silent as to remedies 
for state claims, the states should have the right to protect state 
waters and property through their own legislative remedies. In fact, 
the W.Q.I.A. expressly denies its pre-emption of the states' right to 
impose liability on those responsble for oil spills: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting any State 
or political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirements or 
liability with respect to the discharge of oil into any waters within 
such State. 54 
Under this section, the states are apparently free to provide re-
quirements similar or additional to those provided by the W.Q.I.A. 
However, in Askew, the court stated that an attempt by Congress 
to delegate to the states the power to assess oil spill liability would 
be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 55 In Knick-
erbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the Constitution took all power from the states to interfere 
with the maritime policy of uniformity in international and inter-
state relations. 56 Here Congress had attempted to allow the states to 
legislate employer's liability for maritime workers. The Court 
reasoned that since the principle of maintaining uniformity in 
the maritime law is founded in the Constitution neither the states 
nor Congress itself may pass legislation which conflicts with that 
princi pie. 57 
On the other hand, in The Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Ins. 
CO./8 the United States Supreme Court held that even though con-
tracts for maritime insurance are definitely within the federal ad-
miralty jurisdiction, the fact that Congress has the power to regu-
late does not preclude state regulation where Congress is silent. 
This decision was subsequently clarified in Kossick v. United Fruit 
CO.,59 which held that where federal law is silent, and where there 
is no interest in promoting uniformity and the subject matter is 
peculiarly of state and local concern, then state law may apply. 
Arguably oil pollution damage to state property is sufficiently local 
in nature to allow the application of state law where Congress is 
silent. 
Courts have allowed state direct action statutes against the 
insurer of a shipowner to circumvent the Limited Liability Act, 
at least to the limits of the insurance policy.60 The theory applied 
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here is that the Limited Liability Act was enacted for the sole pur-
pose of protecting the shipping industry and should not apply 
to insurers. Since the states have the right to regulate maritime 
insurance contracts, they should be able to allow recovery directly 
against the insurer. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held in Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing CO.61 that 
the conflict between a state law granting the right of direct action 
and the federal maritime law permitting limited liability is so 
minimal as to be insignificant. However, it should be pointed out 
that the status of direct action statutes is unclear. The United 
States Supreme Court has held that an owner's insurance is not 
an interest to be included in the limitation fund. 62 In addition, 
the Congressional hearings preceding the enactment of the 
W.Q.I.A. demonstrated that Congress is concerned with maintain-
ing the insurability of the shipping industry.6a The argument that 
direct action statutes will be responsible for driving up insurance 
premiums for shipowners may carry more weight as the limit of 
insurability is approached. 
Another case allowing state legislation to enter the field of mari-
time law is Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit.64 Here the 
United States Supreme Court upheld a municipal smoke emission 
statute, containing criminal sanctions, even though it was enforced 
against boiler equipment licensed under federal maritime legisla-
tion. The defendant cement company argued that such local 
legislation is pre-empted by the dominant federal interest in uni-
formity. The Court, however, held that the ordinance was properly 
within the local police power to prevent pollution and did not un-
reasonably obstruct the fire safety objectives of the federal legisla-
tion. 
The preceding cases show the three ways in which state legis-
lation may be allowed to supplement the existing federal maritime 
law. In Wilburn, the Court ruled that Congress was silent and ap-
parently had determined that the government had no interest in 
establishing uniformity in the area of insurance contracts. Thus 
state legislation in that area did not conflict with federal law. In 
Olympic Towing, the court held that although direct action 
statutes do conflict with the federal policy of limitation of liability, 
the statutes affect only the insurance industry, and thus the con-
flict with the maritime law is insignificant. In Huron Portland 
Cement, the Court felt that since the state objective was pollution 
control and the federal objective was fire control, there was no 
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overlap between the laws, and compliance with one should not ex-
empt a ship from compliance with the other. 
In Askew, Florida argued that since the W.Q. I. A. is silent as to 
states' rights of recovery, and since it expressly states that it should 
not be construed as pre-empting the states from imposing liability, 
then states should be able to provide a remedy for themselves. 
However, the Askew court rejected this argument in view of the 
recent decision in Moragne v. State Marine Lines.6f! Here, a long-
shoreman was killed while working aboard a vessel on navigable 
waters in Florida. His widow brought an action for wrongful death, 
alleging unseaworthiness or a violation of maritime duties as a 
basis of recovery. However, the Florida Wrongful Death Statute 
did not allow recovery for unseaworthiness, and the federal death 
statutes, the Death on the High Seas Act66 and the Jones Act,67 
could not apply since the death occurred in state territorial waters. 
The Supreme Court noted that formerly Congress had allowed state 
remedies to apply to deaths within state territorial waters because 
Congress felt such remedies were adequate to effectuate the duties 
imposed by the general maritime law.6s However, the Court held that 
the maritime law should no longer rely on state remedies for wrong-
ful death. The Court reasoned that the refusal of the general 
maritime law to provide a remedy for wrongful death is unsound 
and should be judicially reconsidered in the light of the general 
public policy of allowing recovery for wrongful death. 
Although the United States Supreme Court maintained that the 
former rule occasioned problems of federal-state accomodation,69 
this is far from observing, as the court in Askew puts it, "that ad-
miralty cannot tolerate the inconsistency inherent in accomodating 
state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive con-
cepts."70 The Supreme Court recognized that the principle of uni-
formity will be served by the Court's alteration of the general mari-
time law;71 but to read this as indicating that states may not provide 
a remedy where federal law is silent is a narrow reading and ignores 
existing authority. An equally defensible interpretation of Moragne 
is that the United States Supreme Court recognized the discrepancy 
between remedies for deaths covered by the Death on the High 
Seas Act and for deaths which happen in state territorial waters 
and determined, not that the state remedies were invalid, but that 
in the interests of fairness, clarity, and uniformity, the general 
maritime law should be reinterpreted to provide a remedy where 
previously only state remedies existed. 
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The right of the states to supplement the maritime law has not 
been obliterated by the Moragne decision. However, the most 
important factor in determining the legitimacy of state legislation 
where Congress is silent is whether the state legislation frustrates 
federal policy objectives. Though a state clearly has a strong interest 
in protecting its property from oil pollution damage, the imposi-
tion by states of unlimited liability on shipowners without regard 
to fault appears to frustrate the federal objectives of maintaining 
a uniform standard of liability. Thus, the Askew court found that 
the Florida statute is invalid because of the changes which it would 
make in the substantive maritime law.72 
IMPACT OF THE Askew DECISION 
The Congress has, through the W.Q.I.A., made the policy de-
cision that in order to facilitate the clean up of oil spills, those re-
sponsible should be strictly liable for clean up costs up to 
$14,000,000 or $100 per gross ton, rather than only up to the value 
of vessel and freight under the Limited Liability Act. Congress has 
obviously re-evaluated the amount of liability protection which the 
shipping industry requires, and the re-evaluated limit, as well as 
the strict liability standard, should also apply to state claims for 
clean up costs. Unless the liability for state and federal claims is 
the same, we are led to the following anomalous situation when an 
oil spill occurs. 
(I) If the United States elects to become involved in the removal of 
oil pursuant to the W.Q.I.A. (33 U.S.C. §1161(c)(I)), the limit 
of the vessel owner's liability will be $14,000,000 or $100 per 
gross ton, and recovery will not depend on proof of negligence 
unless the owner can show the existence of one of the four 
exceptions under the W.Q.I.A. (33 U.S.C. §1161(f)(I)). 
(2) If the United States elects not to become involved and a state 
incurs expenses in the clean up operation, a Harbor Towing 
situation occurs where the state must prove negligence and will 
only get a percentage of the limitation fund, which is limited 
to the value of the vessel and its freight. 
(3) If both federal and state governments claim for clean up ex-
penses apparently two separate funds would be set up,n one 
for the federal government with its $14,000,000 limit, and one 
for the state government (and other claimants) with its limit, 
the value of the vessel and its freight. Needless to say, if both 
funds were exhausted, the federal policy of protecting the 
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shipping industry by limiting liability would actually be sub-
jecting the owner to more liability than either statute would 
impose standing alone. 
The Askew court pointed out that the W.Q.I.A. does not mention 
property damage and thus the former standards of proof of negli-
gence and limitation of liability should apply to claims for shore-
line pollution damage. However, such a policy would lead to a 
result similar to (3) above. If an oil spill occurs, and if the federal 
government removes the oil, a fund with the limit of $14,000,000 
is set up to cover the removal costs. Supposedly this is the limit 
which the shipping industry can afford. But if state and private 
property owners bring claims for property damage for maritime 
tort, another fund with the limit of the value of the vessel and its 
freight must be set up to satisfy the property damage claims. Again, 
if both funds are exhausted, the shipowner is subjected to a liability 
which Congress has determined that the industry cannot bear.74 
This points out that the limit and proof of liability should not 
depend on by whom the action is brought, the federal or state 
government, or on what type of claim is brought, clean up expenses 
or property damage. If the shipping industry does indeed require 
protection from unlimited liability, and Congress has apparently 
determined that it does, that limit should apply to all claims and all 
claimants. 
CONCLUSION 
If we accept the conclusion of Askew that state law, even where 
it involves a strong local interest, cannot interfere with express fed-
eral policy objectives, we must determine what those objectives 
are for oil pollution liability. Interpreting the W.Q.I.A. in 
light of the Limited Liability Act it is clear that, right or 
wrong, Congress has reiterated the policy of protecting the ship-
ping industry from unlimited liability. However, the W.Q.I.A. 
indicates that because of the extensive damage caused by oil pollu-
tion, Congress has determined that a vessel owner should be subject 
to strict liability up to $14,000,000 for an oil spill. This represents 
the federal objective in dealing with oil spills, and state legislation 
consistent with the limitations on strict liability, and monetary lia-
bility as presented in the W.Q.I.A., is consistent with that objec-
tive. Therefore, although the states cannot legislate full recovery for 
oil pollution damage by vessels, they should be allowed to legislate 
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recovery up to the limits of the W.Q.I.A. without conflicting with 
federal policy. 
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